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Over the whole 19th century, the Great Powers, and Great Britain in particular, 
consolidated their position within China2 so that at the end of the century, and 
the beginning of the 20th century, there was a marked weakening of the ruling 
Qing, or Manchu, dynasty3 with the Chinese government having to consent 
to the presence of foreign armies in Beijing (Peking) in order to protect 
the diplomatic quarter, or be forced to pay a high fine.4 Immediately upon 
signature of the so-called Boxer Protocol in September 1901, diplomatic 
representatives of Great Britain, Germany and France realised that it was 
absolutely fundamental that the imperial court and local political elite 
proceeded to undertake essential reforms. The British Legation in Beijing 
1 The study has been prepared under the students’ scientific conference Central Europe and 
Overseas – Economic Relations (SVK1–2014–016), solved in the Department of Historical 
Sciences at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of the University of West Bohemia.
2 Cf. for example Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1858, 1859–1860).
3 The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901).
4 More in detail cf. J. KOČVAR, Boxerské povstání v Číně, 1899–1900, in: Historický obzor, 
Vol. 19, No. 9/10, 2008, pp. 204–205. “The Manchurian dynasty again demonstrated its 
inability to protect China from foreign interference. […] They also controlled territory in a 
number of provinces and with the imperial court watching powerlessly, punished Chinese 
subjects as they saw fit for atrocities initiated by the court committed on foreigners and 
Chinese Christians. The dynasty was powerless.” Ibidem, p. 205. “Furthermore, the Boxer 
Rebellion gave China a bad reputation in the West, presenting the Chinese as unpredictable 
savages. It was now clear that the old order had gone. The question remained to what extent 
and with what to replace it.” F. SATRAPA, Mezi tradicí, reformou a revolucí: Čína na sklonku 
císařské éry, in: Historický obzor, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, 2004, p. 265.
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came to the conclusion “that radical changes are necessary to enable this 
ancient empire to maintain a place among the nations”. According to the 
Minister, Ernest Satow, it was nothing more than the first step.5 Another 
important factor illustrating the crucial changes taking place at the beginning 
of the 20th century, was the gradual advocacy of idea of reclaiming “China for 
the Chinese” and the rejection of special rights for the European Powers, who 
therefore supported the imperial court and its attempts at reforms from above 
which would miss out a wide section of the people and ensure they could 
maintain the concessions and influence they had held until then.6
The Russo-Japanese War on dominance in Korea and northern China 
(in Manchuria, from where the last ruling dynasty came from) in 1904–1905 
represented a key milestone in the evolution of international relations and the 
politics of power, even beyond the Far East. The conflict between the two 
undoubted great powers in the region, Tsarist Russia and Japan, a country 
still underestimated (at least in Europe), had somewhat surprising results. In 
early September 1905, St Petersburg had to recognise its defeat in Portsmouth, 
America, and the Land of the Rising Sun took on the status of a great power 
in the Far East alongside Great Britain.
The results of this armed conflict, which at first sight paradoxically 
played out within the territory of a third state, China, undoubtedly affected 
events in China itself. The simple fact that Beijing had to suffer a war 
on its territory, although it was not a party to the conflict, was a clear 
declaration of its weakness and the bygone fame of this once great Far 
East power. The victory of an Asian Power against a European one not 
only rid China of pressure from Russia, but also provided a new impetus 
5 N. P. PETERSSON, Imperialismus und Modernisierung. Siam, China und die europäischen 
Mächte 1895–1914, München 2000, p. 178. “Im Westen hatte man praktisch nach jedem 
größeren Krieg und jeder neuen chinesischen Niederlage den endgültigen Durchbruch 
westlicher Ideen, westlicher Institutionen und westlicher Waren erwartet, und nach dieser 
krassesten Niederlage Chinas erwartete man ihn erst recht.” W. STINGL, Der Ferne Osten 
in der deutschen Politik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1902–1914), Bd. 2, Frankfurt am Main 
1978, p. 377.
6 PETERSSON, p. 188; STINGL, pp. 379–380.
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for attempts at reform in the country, and as such as we can concur with the 
idea: “Modernisierung war von nun an nicht mehr nur eine von außen an 
China gestellte Forderung oder das Anliegen eines kleinen Teils der Eliten, 
sondern das bestimmende Thema der chinesischen Innen- wie Außenpolitik 
[…] Die Reformpolitik  griff auf fast alle Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen 
Lebens über und entwickelte eine eigene, von ihren Initiatoren bald nicht 
mehr zu kontrollierende Dynamik.“7
Japanese victory literally made China “wake up”, specifically arousing 
its political and social life. For perhaps the first time in the country’s history, 
the wider public spoke out, not just the educated and officials. Students8 and 
graduates of Japanese universities, traders who were particularly sensitive 
to European competition and members of the landed gentry got involved. 
Tokyo’s success in the war with Tsarist Russia demonstrated that Asian states 
too could set out on a path to becoming a great power.9 The imperial court, 
however, realised that the methods being used at the time for undertaking 
reforms were insufficient and they would have to rely more on support from 
the above-mentioned sections of society.10 The great powers were well aware 
of the new situation, and talk of China “awakening” did not remain hidden 
from them. Their diplomatic representatives understood the situation, and in 
their declarations they regularly warned that this time it was not the usual 
resistance of officials and parts of the local conservative elite, but rather it 
was a completely new political factor, an upheaval amongst wider sections 
of society, and a rise of national awareness. As such, Europeans suspected, 
7 PETERSSON, p. 201.
8 More students decided to study abroad. More in detail cf. D. TWITCHETT – J. K. FAIR-
BANK, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. II, Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part 2, Cambridge 
UP 1980, p. 376.
9 It should be noted that most politicians, including, e.g. British Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, 
believed in the victory of Russia and feared an impingement of China’s territorial integrity. 
Cf. E. W. EDWARDS, British Diplomacy and Finance in China, 1895–1914, Oxford 1987, p. 
62; K. C. CHAN, British Policy in the Reorganization Loan to China 1912–1913, in: Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1971, p. 356.
10 Cf. PETERSSON, pp. 201–204.
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“daß sich das erwachsende Nationalgefühl in China zuerst gegen ihre 
wirtschaftliche Präsenz und ihre Privilegien wandte”.11
One of the by-products of the Chinese government’s new course was 
their attempts at financing the construction of the railway using their own funds. 
The other side of the coin, however, was that it proved impossible to collect 
enough finances, meaning most ambitious plans remained just on paper; the 
local gentry in the various provinces were unable to raise the money necessary 
and they had to face the fact that without foreign capital the railways could not 
be built.12 Conversely, the great powers also had to deal with new conditions 
for their activities. The period subsequent to 1905 was a period of gradual 
co-operation, which reached its zenith in 1909–1910 with the formation of a 
banking consortium (of British, German, French and American banks), which 
provided China with the necessary finances.13
The first decade of the 20th century saw a fundamental change in Chinese 
history. The imperial court “together with provincial dignitaries made an 
attempt at real and deep reform, a kind of revolutionary transformation 
of the state and civilisation at a speed probably unprecedented in human 
history”.14 There was to be a complete overturning of the social and economic 
order nationwide in response to the situation it found itself in. The question 
11 Ibidem, p. 210. British Minister in Beijing, Ernest Satow, gave an apt description in his letter 
to the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey: “I mean that China is no longer as ready to submit to 
all and every demand of the Powers as she was, and unless she gets another knock-down blow, 
will in the future be less and less tractable.” The National Archives, London, Kew (hereafter 
TNA), Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 800/44 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ 
Papers, Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount), China), Satow to Grey, Peking, 31st March 1906, fol. 61. 
The German Military Attaché in Beijing, Major von Clear, had the same feeling, noting that 
China had been reserved until the end of the war, but the situation had changed after signature 
of the peace treaty. Increased national self-confidence, boycotts of foreign goods and a new 
foreign policy were all clear proof of this change, in his opinion. Cf. Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin (hereafter PA AA), China No. 1, R 17686, Claer an das Königlich 
Preussische Kriegsministerium, 20th Dezember 1905, f. 000092.
12 CF. A. SKŘIVAN, Výstavba železniční sítě v Číně do světové hospodářské krize, in: Acta 
Universitatis Carolinae, Philosophica et Historica 1, Studia Historica XII, 1974, p. 17.
13 EDWARDS, p. 89.
14 SATRAPA, p. 265.
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remained, however, as to whether the transformation required would usher in 
the desired results.
Germany’s Position and its Economic Interests in China
After its founding (18 January 1871), the German Empire took over Prussian 
interests in China, and focused in particular on supplying combat materials; 
they also sent their military trainers to China. In general, however, Berlin’s 
opinions even in this region were governed by Bismarck’s cautious policies 
in the 1880s and early 1890s, which differentiated the diplomatic sphere 
from economic matters. Despite this, however, “konnten die wirtschaftlichen 
Kontakte sogar gut ausgebaut werden, insbesondere auf dem Gebiet der 
Chemie- und Metallwaren. Auch die Einfuhren aus China – Häute, Galläpfel, 
Federn, Eiprodukte – stiegen beträchtlich”.15 The final three decades of the 
19th century were fundamental in terms of Chinese history. The revolutionary 
processes which were occurring in Europe and beyond it (the unification of 
Germany and Italy, the beginning of Meiji Restoration in Japan and events in 
France) focused the interests of the European powers on the Far East. Germany 
wasn’t left out either, although its position was nowhere near as strong as that 
of Great Britain, the largest hegemon in the Far East. In the mid-1880s, for 
example, London and Beijing refused to allow Berlin to participate in the war 
loan. Despite state support and growth in Germany’s share of foreign trade, 
results remained somewhat below expectations. By the mid-1890s, however, 
successes were seen at least in the weapons industry field, where Berlin was 
even comparable to London according to Udo Ratenhof.16
 The key event of the last decade of the 19th century was the Sino-
Japanese War,17 which finally did away with China’s position as, at least 
15 U. RATENHOF, Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945. Wirtschaft – 
Rüstung – Militär, Boppard am Rhein 1987, p. 106.
16 Cf. ibidem, pp. 107–108, 110, 125–126.
17 More in detail cf. e.g. S. C. M. PAINE, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Perceptions, 
Power, and Primacy, Cambrige, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São 
Paulo, Delhi 2003.
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verbally and theoretically, the key Asian major power, and marked the entrance 
of Japan. China’s defeat undermined its traditionally high self-confidence and 
allowed the Western Powers to begin to fight for concessions and influence.18 
The Powers’ attempts focused on acquiring naval footholds, railway and 
mining concessions and attaining “recognised” spheres of influence. By the 
end of 1898, the powers had acquired railway concessions for the construction 
of thousands of kilometres of lines in China, mining monopolies for whole 
provinces were awarded to European powers or private concession “hunters”, 
and it appeared that all of China’s modernisation had fallen into the hands of 
Europeans. Russia, France and Great Britain acquired lease of a number of 
Chinese ports.19 Germany was determined not to stand aside, especially when 
other powers already had influence in Asia – Britain in Hong Kong, France 
in Tonkin and Russia in Vladivostok. Beijing first of all rejected Germany’s 
initiative, but in 1897 two German missionaries were murdered (Franz Nies 
and Richard Henle) in the province of Shandong, and a year later Berlin forced 
the Chinese government to lease it territory in Jiaozhou (Kiautschou) Bay 
along with the village of Qingdao (Tsingtau), which became the administrative 
centre and base for Germany’s concession in China.20
In terms of railway policy, specifically the construction of the railway 
network, which can be considered an important agent in economic development 
and results in a boom for each state, the first to declare their “place in the sun” 
was Great Britain, beginning from the 1860s. In terms of kilometres of railway 
18 The era of co-operation ended and an era of competition began. PETERSSON, p. 35.
19 Ibidem, p. 61. “As is well-established in the scholarly literature, the battle for railway 
and mining concessions in China reached its height between 1895 and 1900, that is, in the 
years after the Sino-Japanese War and the end of the Boxer Rising.” I. PHIMISTER, Foreign 
Devils, Finance and International Empire: Britain and China c. 1900–1912, in: Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2006, p. 738.
20 Cf. e.g. TWITCHETT – FAIRBANK, p. 112. This occurred with an agreement dated 6 
March 1898. Cf. J. V. A. MACMURRAY (ed.), Treaties and Agreements with and concerning 
China 1894–1919, Vol. I., Manchu Period (1894–1911), New York, Oxford UP 1921, pp. 
112–118. In terms of the railways, the second section was significant, where it awarded 
concessions for two railway lines. Ibidem, pp. 115–116. The agreement was signed by Baron 
Gustav von Heyking for Germany and Li Hongzhang and Weng Tonghe for China.
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line, China had amongst the fewest, with just 320 km of railway lines in its 
territory in 1890.21 A trigger for increasing economic penetration of China 
was the above mentioned Sino-Japanese War. The great powers realised there 
were opportunities for suitable investments which could guarantee high and 
fairly easy to attain profits. Berlin wasn’t left behind, and after the occupation 
of Jiaozhou asked for a licence to be granted to them to construct the railway 
from Jiaozhou to Shandong Province’s capital city of Jinan.22 Beijing granted 
this request, and the construction, which was completed in 1903, was taken 
over by the combined Schantung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, which was founded 
by Deutschasiatische Bank in June 1899 and had share capital of 54 million 
marks and was headquartered both in Berlin and in Qingdao.23
So it was that at the end of the 19th century, Germany too had influence 
and concessions for railway construction and in the mining field which 
it consolidated in the early 20th century. The region of its interests was the 
province of Shandong, where Berlin decided to build up its strategic domain: 
railways from the province might be able to open a route to the Yangtze valley 
for German companies, an area under the British sphere of influence. On the 
other hand, Niels Petersson claims that the prevailing opinion in Germany 
was that Berlin had been outmanoeuvred in the region. Industrial and business 
circles as such were still interested in the Yangtze region and rejected the 
21 SKŘIVAN, p. 7; A. L. ROSENBAUM, The Manchuria Bridgehead: Anglo-Russian Rivalry 
and the Imperial Railways of North China, 1897–1902, in: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, 1976, p. 42. The impossibility of mobilising domestic capital for railway construction 
forced China to ask for foreign capital to modernise its infrastructure. It had to accede to 
their terms and conditions in providing better interest rates, and also the condition that until 
the debt was paid the foreign subjects would also control the lines and supply material for 
their construction. These circumstances allowed European governments to enforce better 
conditions for their businesses. It was agreed that after payment of the debt, the lines would 
transfer to Chinese ownership and that profits from operating the lines would then be used to 
pay off other debts. PETERSSON, p. 56.
22 We can concur with the opinion which was prevalent in June 1902 and which stated that 
construction of the railway in the Shandong province meant a lot for Germany, specifically 
confirming its position of power in Asia. C. WENDELS, Die Schantung Eisenbahn. Das 
Interesse der Finanzwelt an der deutschen Bahnlinie in Ostchina, Siegburg 2012, p. 19.
23 SKŘIVAN, p. 11; WENDELS, p. 37.
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idea that the Yangtze valley would remain with the British and that Germany 
should be satisfied with Shandong.24 As such, Germany and the other Great 
Powers announced their support for an open door policy, while at the same 
time clearly guarding over their own spheres of influence. After the Boxer 
Rebellion, which suspended all work on the railways, it became clear that it 
would be counterproductive to deal with the new problems in the old manner, 
and that China would have to undergo a fundamental transformation. This 
didn’t happen and the Sino-Japanese War denied both China and the Great 
Powers new challenges both in the political and economic fields.
Germany and the Railway Problem following the End of the Russo-
Japanese War
When the Russo-Japanese War ended with signature of the peace agreement 
in Portsmouth, America, in September 1905, it represented a crucial point 
not just for China, but also for the economic interests of the Great Powers. 
Chambers of commerce began to be set up in China, providing space for 
forming the opinion that it was necessary to take on the challenge of foreign 
powers, and to fight and beat them using their own means. “Sie lehnten den 
ihnen ‘barbarisch’ erscheinenden Fremdenhaß der Boxer ab und propagierten 
das ‘zivilisierte Hinausdrängen der Fremden’, ‘Konkurrenzfähigkeit’ und das 
‘Aufholen’ gegenüber den Mächten,” is how Niels Petersson described it.25 The 
imperial government had had to helplessly watch as the Great Powers fought 
for control over Manchuria, the region its own ruling dynasty came from. In 
terms of railway construction, it was important that the Western powers had 
the technical and organisational superiority over the Chinese, who were behind 
in this respect. A key deficiency of the Chinese side was also their continuing 
lack of sufficient capital, which resulted in an absence of modern lending, high 
interest rates and very low legal certainty. The idea of constructing the railways 
using only Chinese resources and workers was as such entirely unrealistic.
24 PETERSSON, p. 81.
25 Ibidem, p. 202.
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 Each Great Power responded differently to the turnaround in 1905 in 
line with their own ideas. For Great Britain, the Portsmouth peace meant the 
end of their fears of Russian expansion in Manchuria, and in a wider context 
the end of great power rivalry with the Tsarist Empire in China; London could 
now focus on co-operation with Japan, who had won but were financially 
drained. France justifiably felt weakened, and its politicians feared that Tokyo 
would now focus on its area of interest, Indochina. The defeat of its ally, 
Russia, naturally affected its position in the Concert of Europe. Neither could 
Germany claim that the result of the Russo-Japanese War had strengthened 
its position in China. Its zone of influence, Jiaozhou, could in future become 
an easy target for Japan. All three great powers, however, realised that the 
awakening Chinese nationalism would primarily turn against their influencing 
of Chinese economics and the privileges they had attained in the past.26
 Just a few days before peace was concluded in Portsmouth, American 
President Theodore Roosevelt announced that more than a year of discussions 
between the Chinese Minister in Washington and representatives of the 
American China Development Company which related to a railway from 
Canton (Guangzhou) to Shanshui had ended. The agreement led to the result 
that the concession “held by the company for the construction of this important 
trunk line is cancelled and the Chinese obtain full ownership and control of 
the 21-mile section of completed railway running from Canton”.27 The author 
of an article in The Times added correctly that such a step would undoubtedly 
affect the future approach to all railway concessions within China and that it 
would have to be very carefully considered by all.28
 There were immediately rumours that Great Britain had closely 
monitored the Chinese approach, and had been involved in buying back the 
26 Ibidem, p. 210.
27 The Times, 4th September 1905.
28 Ibidem. Two days earlier, the German Embassy in Washington reported this: “Die Frage der 
Hankow-Canton-Bahn-Konzession ist nunmehr durch Rückkauf der Konzession seitens der 
Chinesischen Regierung aus der Welt geschafft.” PA AA, China No. 4, R 17827, Kaiserlich 
Deutsche Botschaft an Bülow, 2nd September 1905, f. 000112.
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concession. This suspicion was denied by the German Embassy’s counsellor in 
London, Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, who informed the Auswärtiges Amt that 
according to his sources London had had nothing to do with it and Beijing was 
determined to continue in this approach. He also added that for the railways in the 
provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan (Szechwan) there was a valid British-French 
contract which guaranteed standard co-operation of both countries. “Von neuen 
Konzessionen sei aber vorläufig noch nicht die Rede,” added the diplomat.29
 This information from the German Embassies in Washington and 
London just confirmed the sentiments present in the Chinese public in relation 
to the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Attempts at buying back concessions 
which had been provided, and at continuing railway construction through their 
own means, reflected a generally widespread demand that China lift itself out 
from the influence of foreign capital and Great Power guardians.
 Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, however, continued in discussions 
with British bankers and politicians on London’s policy in regard to the railways 
in China. He met the head of the Foreign Office’s China section, Francis 
Alexander Campbell, who told him that the situation in China had changed 
and that the Chinese had decided either to build the railways themselves or to 
abandon everything. At the end of the discussion, Campbell declared that the 
discussion on “deutsch-englische Konzession schienen leidlich vorwärts zu 
gehen”. At first, the British banks hesitated, but once Deutschasiatische Bank 
provided guarantees for further construction, all doubts vanished.30
 In late September 1905, Berlin received a report from the German 
consulate in Jinan which confirmed local authorities’ attempts at getting 
the railway construction under Chinese control: “Nach der in Übersetzung 
gehorsamst beigefügten Notiz in der hiesigen ‘Chienpao’ haben am 16. d. M. 
einflußreiche Notabeln mit den Direktoren der Ämter für Handel, Eisenbahnen 
und Auswärtiges eine Beratung über den Bau von Eisenbahnen in Schantung 
29 Ibidem, Bernstorff an Bülow, 14th September 1905, f. 000125. Cf. also ibidem, Bernstorff an 
Bülow, 19th September 1905, ff. 000137–000140.
30 Ibidem, 19th September 1905, ff. 000148–000149.
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mit in der Provinz selbst aufgebrachten Mitteln abgehalten.”31 The report 
continued with the claim that acting governor Yang was also in favour of the 
step. On the other hand, the report’s author (Dr. Betz) informed the German 
Minister in Beijing, Philipp Alfons von Mumm32 that he didn’t need to take 
the issue too seriously, because there was a general opinion that the Chinese 
would not be able to raise sufficient capital take such a step.33
 As can be seen, Germany and Shandong province weren’t exempt 
from Chinese attempts at gaining control of railway construction. As for the 
other Great Powers, these were mainly naïve ideas which didn’t take hard 
economic facts into account. As such, the German side, aware that Chinese 
demands were unrealistic, decided that it wouldn’t even protest against any 
such steps taken by the local elite. Minister, Mumm, was willing to consider 
such an approach only if the Auswärtiges Amt empowered him to do so.34
 A broader report on the continuing situation following the end of the 
Russo-Japanese War was given by German Consul-General in Shanghai, 
Wilhelm Knappe, in early October 1905.35 He began by stating that the above 
detailed attempts could be observed right from the beginning of the conflict 
and that here and there, there were figureheads who were to secure China 
at least parity in shareholding for railway and mining companies. “Der 
Wahlspruch ‘China für die Chinesen’ ist heute in allen Kreisen der Bevölkerung 
so stark geworden, dass die Regierung es kaum wagen kann, Konzessionen 
für Bergwerks Eisenbahnen an Fremde zu vergeben,” added the Consul.36 
Germany’s diplomat claimed that the foreign concessionaries themselves bore 
some of the blame for the situation, because the Chinese government, forced 
by circumstances, had provided one concession after another but the great 
31 Ibidem, Betz an Mumm, 19th September 1905, f. 000229.
32 Philipp Alfons Freiherr Mumm von Schwarzenstein (1859–1924), in the years 1900–1905 
the German Minister in Beijing.
33 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17827, fol. 000229–000230. Translation of article in Chienpao 
paper cf. ibidem, f. 000231.
34 Ibidem, Mumm an Betz, 29th September 1905, f. 000232.
35 He held the post from 1898 to 1905.
36 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17827, Knappe an Bülow, 5th Oktober 1905, ff. 000243–000244.
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powers hadn’t take full advantage of this. He claimed that the English held 
concessions for railway construction with a total length of 2,800 English miles 
in 1898, but had so far built only 570 English miles and had begun work on a 
further 180 miles. “Es ist ganz begreiflich, dass den Chinesen schliesslich die 
Geduld ausging,” was the Consul’s logical conclusion.37 It was an interesting 
conclusion, and on China’s general attempts at getting railway construction 
under its own control the diplomat added that the Great Powers were partially 
unable to fulfil their commitments and take advantage of the concessions 
awarded to them. It was no wonder that China wanted to buy them back.
 In mid-October, Mumm sent out a report on the German railways in 
Shandong which informed the Chancellor of Germany that construction of “einer 
Eisenbahn von Weihsien nach Tschifu, die bezwecken soll, die Waren, die jetzt auf 
der Shantung Eisenbahn von und nach Tsingtau befördert werden, nach Tschifu 
abzuziehen, wird von den Neidern der Entwickelung des deutschen Handels in 
Shantung immer wieder von neuem geplant, ohne dass das Projekt bisher der 
Ausführung näher gekommen wäre”.38 And he continued with the claim that a 
number of Chinese businessmen had expressed interest in construction of the 
above detailed line, although in the opposite direction, but that its implementation 
would not be possible in the near future. The Minister also added that he had found 
out from de Marteau, an Austrian engineer who was working in the region for a 
number of French companies, that one particular Chinese general was interested in 
construction of a railway from Yantai (Chefoo) to Weifang, which was to compete 
with the German Shandong line. In the end, everything was explained, as it was 
shown that the general mentioned was a fraudster who had absolutely no money.39
37 Ibidem, f. 000244. The Consul also recognised that Great Britain’s position in the Yangtze 
River valley was steadfast, even though this hadn’t been the case two years previously. Cf. 
ibidem, f. 000248. Mumm also informed Chancellor Bülow of Japan’s growing pressure not 
just in Nanjing but also in other Chinese provinces. Cf. PA AA, China No. 1, R 17684, Mumm 
an Bülow, 12th Oktober 1905, f. 000088. “Wie an anderen bedeutenderen Plätzes Chinas 
sind die Japaner auch in Nanking seit mehreren Jahren bestrebt auf die inneren Verhältnisse 
Einfluss zu gewinnen.” Ibidem, Gebsattel an Mumm, 8th Oktober 1905, f. 000089.
38 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Mumm an Bülow, 16th Oktober 1905, f. 000029.
39 Ibidem, f. 000030.
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 At the end of October 1905, Mumm returned to the above mentioned 
repurchasing of the railway concession from Canton to Shanshui, informing 
Chancellor Bülow of the method with which eminent statesman, Zhang 
Zhidong, had acquired money for this transaction. According to the German 
diplomat, he had agreed with the governor of Hong Kong and further Zhang 
had been authorised by imperial decree to undertake all steps necessary. 
“Die getroffenen Vereinbarungen sind von dem Kaiser von China genehmigt 
worden, wie sich auch die englische Regierung mit der leihweisen Hergabe des 
Anleihebetrages von 1.100.000 £ einverstanden erklärt hat,” added Mumm.40 
Naturally, he didn’t speak of English inspiration or participation, continued 
the Minister, further informing the Chancellor that according to his sources, in 
this way London’s co-operation with Paris had clearly suffered.41
 At the end of 1905 then, the Chinese policy of attempting to regain its 
concessions for railway construction which Beijing had handed out for foreign 
capital at the end of the 19th century was in full flow. German diplomatic 
representatives in China, however, repeatedly stated that China didn’t have 
enough resources to build the railways themselves. According to Mumm’s 
report, Beijing had succeeded in beginning construction of two short lines.42 
On the other hand, the great powers were also competing, with, e.g., money for 
buying back the concession for the railway from Canton to Shanshui provided 
by English banks, although this information was not officially disseminated. 
This approach naturally affected relations between Britain and France above all.
 In February 1906, German Consul in Canton, Heintges returned to 
the problem of acquiring money for repurchasing the railway concession 
from Canton to Shanshui when he informed Chancellor Bülow that while the 
40 Ibidem, Mumm an Bülow, 24th Oktober 1905, f. 000032. Income from the taxing of domestic 
opium in the provinces of Hubei, Hunan and Guangdong was pledged as compensation for 
providing the loans. Ibidem.
41 Ibidem, f. 000033. In another report, Mumm told Bülow that the Chinese side was obliged 
to turn primarily to English banks should further capital be required. Cf. ibidem, Mumm an 
Bülow, 1st November 1905, f. 000044.
42 Ibidem, Mumm an Bülow, 18th Dezember 1905, f. 000071.
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projects of the Governor General Zhang Zhidong had only resulted in state 
debts growing further, or its funds being used for other purposes, “ist jetzt nur 
noch von der Aufbringung des für die gennante Bahn erforderlichen Kapitals 
die Rede”.43 The Consul reasoned that the local gentry had issued lists for 
subscribing to shares, and portrayed any profits rather rosily to the owners of 
these shares. “Das hat die Gewinnsucht der Bevölkerung gereizt, und es ist 
nun von nichts anderem mehr die Rede,” stated Heintges.44 As can be seen, 
people’s movements and the clever propaganda of local elites had managed 
to rouse enthusiasts enough to make them purchase shares and fall for the 
prospect of profit, which did not, however, correspond to reality.
 The first four months of 1906 showed that the trend seen since the end 
of the Russo-Japanese War was continuing. China had decided to buy back the 
concessions it had provided for railway construction, and as the above detailed 
case showed, in a small number of cases it was even succeeding. It was also 
demonstrated that if it was possible, the Great Powers wanted to come to 
an agreement with Beijing, possibly inflicting damage on their competitors. 
German diplomats repeated, elaborated and gave detailed information to their 
superiors on the activities not just of the Chinese, but also other foreigners, in 
particular from the perspective of the German sphere of influence.45
 At the end of April 1906, Mumm travelled from Beijing to Shanshui 
accompanied by attaché, Waldamar von Sheven, along the new railway 
about which the Minister said much had already been written. Nevertheless, 
he attempted once again to briefly summarise its basic technical details to 
Chancellor Bülow. His report said the length of the line was 1,250 km, the 
material used in its construction came mainly from Belgium, the engines from 
France. The main engineer came from Belgium and was called Jean Jadot, 
43 Ibidem, Heintges an Bülow, 20th Februar 1906, f. 000109.
44 Ibidem. For further information on this problem, cf. ibidem Heintges an Bülow, 26th März 
1906, ff. 000112–000113.
45 They were also well aware of the importance of protecting German trade. Cf. e.g. PA 
AA, China No. 1, R 17688, Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft Peking an das Königlich 
Preussische Kriegsministerium, 20th Februar 1906, ff. 000033–000035.
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wrote Mumm, and added that the initial capital amounted to 124.5 million 
francs.46 The German diplomat also referred to one point of interest when he 
noted: “Der Zug, mit dem ich von Peking abfuhr, ist der erste Eisenbahnzug in 
China, der fahrplanmässig auch des Nachts fährt. Er geht einmal wöchentlich, 
ab Peking Montags um 9,30 Abends, und durchmisst die Strecke bis Hankau, 
wo er Mittwoch Morgen um 10,15 ankommt, in etwas über 36 Stunden.”47 
Mumm continued his description of further technical parameters; his report 
said the trains travelled at 55 km per hour during the day, and 30 km/hr at 
night. The train had undertaken its first journey on 16 April 1906, “so dass 
ich, als ich am 23. d. M. abfuhr, noch den Reiz der Neuheit genoss,” added the 
Ambassador. He said the food and service were good. 11 people travelled in 
first class, with at least 10 covering costs for the journey. A ticket in first class 
from Beijing to Shanshui cost after conversion roughly 141 marks, added 
Mumm.48 Although this report from the German Minister in Beijing was not 
devoid of interest, it was more informative in nature and did not contain any 
fundamental assessment of Berlin’s interests in China, nor of its railway policy.
 Great Power policies in the field of railways in China was more 
obviously on Berlin’s agenda in mid-June 1906 when an employee of the 
German Embassy in London, Wilhelm zu Stolberg-Wernigerode informed 
Chancellor Bülow of a speech by the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, who in the House of Commons had 
declared that discussions were still ongoing between the British and Chinese 
governments in regard to the construction and operation of the railway line 
between Canton and Kowloon. Enclosed with his report, Stolberg mentioned 
an article in The Times newspaper, which quoted Churchill’s declaration in 
which amongst other items the British politician declared that: “The British 
section, which is in active progress, has been constructed from the first under 
the supervision of the consulting engineer, and there has been no change of 
46 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Mumm an Bülow, 26th April 1906, f. 000132.
47 Ibidem, f. 000133.
48 Ibidem.
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policy in this respect. All the steps taken have had the full concurrence of the 
Governor of Hong-Kong.”49
Churchill was clearly responding to worrying reports regarding the 
development of the above-mentioned line. A month earlier, German Consul 
in Canton, Heintges, had informed Berlin of disputes which had broken out 
between the “Gentry” and “Kaufmannschaft”. According to the diplomat, the 
former group had complained to the Ministry of Trade, which requested an 
explanation from the Governor General. The whole dispute revolved around 
power conflicts between the two groups where one was taking advantage of 
the weakness of the other and perfectly illustrated the Chinese environment 
for railway construction. In concluding his report, the Consul stated that they 
would have to await further developments.50
German diplomatic representatives didn’t just follow the trading and 
political interests of their great competitor, Great Britain, in the Far East and 
China however, as their diplomats also took note of the new and post-1905 
growing Great Power of Japan. An Embassy employee in Tokyo reported to 
Berlin that on the basis of an imperial decree, the South Manchuria Railway 
Company (Südmanschurische Eisenbahn-Aktiengesellschaft) had been 
founded, which was to be headquartered in Tokyo and have a branch in Dalian. 
“Als Aktionäre werden nur die Regierungen von Japan und China sowie die 
beiderseitigen Staatsangehörigen zugelassen (§2),” added the diplomat.51 
The Japanese press welcomed the formation of the company as another step 
towards peace penetrating Manchuria. An important factor proved to be the 
absence of foreign capital, which was also naturally noticed by the Embassy 
employee. He added, however, that a way was sure to be found to change this 
state.52
49 Cf. ibidem, Stolberg an Bülow, 14th Juni 1906, ff. 000135–000136. Cf. also f. 000143.
50 The full report cf. ibidem, Heintges an Bülow, 19th Mai 1906, ff. 000146–000153.
51 Ibidem, Erckert an Bülow, 15th Juni 1906, ff. 000159–000160. For details on revenue cf. 
ibidem, f. 000160.
52 Ibidem, f. 000161. For an English translation of the imperial revenue cf. ibidem, ff. 000163–
000164.
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Mid-1906 confirmed the growing interest of both Great Britain and Japan 
in railway policy in China. Both London and Tokyo were clearly monitoring 
their interests in spheres of influence, something Berlin was aware of. On the 
other hand, it should be noted that, at least according to reports from German 
diplomats in China from the first half of 1906, Germany had somewhat eased 
back in attempting to implement a more offensive policy in the railway field, 
or at least the intensity of reports from China suggest this.
But Berlin was ever more monitoring the competition between other 
great powers, in particular Great Britain and France. A newspaper report from 
Kölnische Zeitung responded to the many years of clashes between London and 
Paris in the provinces of south and south-west China. According to the paper, 
from the mid-1880s “hat ein beständig zunehmender englisch-französischer 
Wettlauf nach den Märkten von Jünnan, Ssetschuan und Kuangsi eingesetzt”.53 
The article author declared the key reason for conflict to be railway construction, 
where now France was at an advantage having managing to build the 445 km 
Laokai-Jünnanfu line it had received a concession for in 1898 without any major 
problems and despite the unfavourable climate. In contrast, Great Britain had 
achieved almost nothing in terms of railways and it seemed that its plans could 
not easily be estimated. The paper said that relations between both countries in 
the region were not good, but immediately added that the disciplined English 
press had toned down somewhat its anti-French tone with the signing of the 
Entente Cordiale (1904). Reports from the French capital, however, gave 
a different impression, and Kölnische Zeitung wrote that if there was no 
peaceful settlement an escalation of tension could be expected.54
At the end of June 1906, the German consulate in Shanshui wrote of the 
situation upstream on the Yangtze, where river currents made meaningful trade 
between Sichuan and the provinces downstream on the Yangtze impossible. 
Consulate employee, Walter Rößler said that since a German steamship had 
sunk there in 1900, “hat kein Handelsdampfer mehr gewagt, die Fahrt auf 
53 Kölnische Zeitung, 28th Juli 1906.
54 Ibidem.
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dem oberen Yangtse wieder aufzunehmen”.55 As such there had been general 
agreement for a number of years that the only possible link to Sichuan 
could be rail, said Rößler, adding that after a long dispute Great Britain and 
France had come to a joint approach. He claimed, however, that the Chinese 
government had decided, “die Bahn mit eigenen Mitteln zu bauen und Fremde 
grundsätzlich von dem Unternehmen auszuschliessen”.56
Once again, attempts of the imperial government to boost its position 
compared to the foreign powers by performing railway construction itself 
were observed. And once again China’s clear financial weakness was seen 
because, according to Walter Rößler’s report, construction of the railway would 
require capital of roughly 50 million taels (153,500,000 marks) according to 
preliminary estimates. The status at the time, however, suggested that in an 
optimistic scenario the government had altogether a mere 800 million taels 
(2,456,000 marks). “Die Begeisterung, die unter dem Stichwort ‘China für 
die Chinesen’ anfangs hohe Flammen schlug, beginnt zu verrauchen,” stated 
the diplomat correctly.57 Instead of enthusiasm, he said, conflict, envy and 
mistrust were seen, and it was now clear that the construction of this important 
railway to the province of Sichuan would not get going. Despite this, local 
authorities in Wuchang were of the opinion that something must happen, 
stated Rößler.58 It was, however, clear that without foreign capital the process 
of railway construction in China could not be effectively managed. Not just 
British and French, but also German money should await their opportunity, 
which was sure to be expressed according to the diplomat.
The issue of the railways was at the forefront of German diplomats’ 
interests once again in mid-August 1906 when Krüger, Consul in Hong Kong 
55 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Rößler an Bülow, 29th Juni 1906, f. 000180.
56 Ibidem, f. 000181.
57 Ibidem, f. 000182. Goltz, chargé d’affaires at the Beijing Legation, said much the same in 
a letter to Chancellor Bülow a few months later, writing that initial hopes of modernisation in 
China were fading because conservative circles were acting against it. Cf. PA AA, China No. 
1, R 17690, Goltz an Bülow, 4th Oktober 1906, f. 000013.
58 Srv. PA AA, China No. 4, R 17828, Rößler an Bülow, 29th Juni 1906, ff. 000182–000184.
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wrote that the management of the local branch of “Deutsch Asiatischen 
Bank [H. Suter – authors’ note] hatte in den letzten Tagen Verhandlungen mit 
einigen massgebenden Chinesen der Canton-Hankau Bahnbaugesellschaft 
über die Berufung eines deutschen Eisenbahntechnikers als Chefingenieur”.59 
He further pondered whether it was even possible for such a post to be held 
by anyone other than an Englishman. His ironic and biting remarks, however, 
came to the conclusion that such an eventuality was highly unlikely.60
The question of the main engineer was naturally of some importance. 
The most likely option appeared to be certain Englishman, and also under 
consideration was a Belgian and the already mentioned German. It was a well-
known fact that the English and French weren’t particularly popular, while 
Belgium lacked the political influence to be able to get their man into this 
important post. A Japanese candidate was completely out of the question. The 
German engineer would certainly meet the professional criteria, he would be 
backed by real political weight and it could be expected that there would be 
no great protests against him in the construction of the Shandong railway. 
In the end, engineer Peter Hildebrand, who had already had experience with 
construction of the Jiaozhou-Jinan railway, expressed his willingness to take 
part in the implementation of the line from Canton to Shanshui. Not even 
Beijing proved to be against his engagement.61
If this option had happened, it would naturally have meant significant 
success not just for Hildebrand himself, but also for potential German suppliers, 
as the main engineer was naturally able to influence the method and form of 
supplies of necessary commodities without which the construction couldn’t go 
ahead, and Germany’s importance would be boosted in an area which wasn’t 
directly under its influence, being rather under British influence.
The Daily Press newspaper, which was published in Hong Kong, 
discussed this problem (published 15 August 1906), and it wrote than in 
59 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17829, Krüger an Bülow, 17th August 1906, f. 000015.
60 Ibidem, f. 000016.
61 Cf. ibidem, ff. 000017–000019.
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building the Canton-Shanshui railway line, problems could be expected in 
acquiring Chinese engineers. “Then came the amusing correspondence as 
to the relative merits of different foreign engineers, and the unconsciously 
disrespectful way in which the Chinese referred to some as being cheaper 
than others made Englishmen smile,” says the article’s author.62 He then 
developed the idea that choosing a Belgian engineer for a railway which is 
to a certain extent dependent on British capital lacks logic. Astonishingly, 
the article doesn’t mention the option of naming German engineer, Peter 
Hildebrand. Nevertheless, it is written in the spirit of the dominance of 
British capital and experience over anything else and ends with an informal 
recommendation that calm will reign in the Canton region only once a new 
Chinese viceroy is named.63
German diplomats monitored British interests in the region around 
Canton with increased attention. At the end of September 1906, Goltz, the 
chargé d’affaires at the Embassy in Beijing, handed a report to Chancellor 
Bülow from an employee of the Canton consulate on the railway line 
project from Canton to Huangpu (formerly Whampoa), where following 
replacement of the Chinese Governor General, London’s hopes for 
implementing construction of this line were raised.64 The consulate in 
Canton informed the Beijing Embassy that while the Canton-Kowloon 
railway project had come to a halt, the line from Canton to Huangpu was 
a priority. The Governor General, Tsen, apparently ordered the purchase of 
the land necessary and the punishment of any citizens who resist. “Tsen, der 
seinen letzten Erholungsurlaub grösstenteils in Whampoa verbracht hatte, 
scheint sich dort von dem Nutzen des vielerörterten Projekts, aus Whampoa 
62 The Daily Press, 15th August 1906.
63 Ibidem.
64 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17829, Goltz an Bülow, 26th September 1906, f. 000080. Already 
in December 1905, Consul Heintges in Canton had written to Mumm that the company 
Carlowitz & Co. had presented its plan and that discussions were going well. The Consul 
saw an opportunity for German capital here. Cf. PA AA, China No. 1, R 17686, Heintges an 
Mumm, 8th Dezember 1905, ff. 000084–000085.
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einen Seehafen zu machen und hiermit einen erheblichen Teil des Handels 
von Hongkong abzulenken, überzeugt zu haben,” adds the report’s author, 
Dr Walter.65
It then continues with a description of British protests against the 
arbitrariness of the Chinese official, with the British chargé d’affaires in 
Beijing making a complaint and claiming that the plan to construct the line 
from Canton to Huangpu contravened British-Chinese agreements and must 
be stopped. Walter branded the protest obscure, but in his opinion London was 
right to fear not just damage to its interests in Hong Kong, but also the reduced 
importance of the Canton-Kowloon line.66
As can be seen, attempts by the local Chinese elite to build the railway 
using their own means, or attempts to extricate themselves from the influence 
of British capital, were met with the resistance of British diplomats. Whether 
it was regarding the Canton-Shanshui line, or the railway from Canton to 
Huangpu, London always kept a close eye on everything and given its position 
responded in an appropriate manner. It was clear, however, that Beijing was 
determined to follow the Japanese example and strive for independence in 
railway construction. German diplomats noted Chinese attempts with due 
attention, but one cannot detect a clear preference for one side or the other in 
their reports.
But Germany too had to keep an eye on its interests. In mid-October 
1906, Consul Merklinghaus from Jinan informed the Beijing Embassy that 
the Japanese Consul in Yantai, Obata, had offered to provide the Chinese 
with engineers and capital to construct the railway from Yantai to Weifang, 
something Merklinhaus’s report says didn’t work out. The local governor 
rejected it because it was counter to the contract on lease of the enclave of 
Jiaozhou. The German Consul added at the end that the Japanese attempt 
at creating a counterbalance to Qingdao did not need to be perceived as a 
65 PA AA, China No. 4, R 17829, Goltz an Bülow, 26th September 1906, f. 000081.
66 Ibidem, ff. 000082–000083. In the end, an agreement was reached. Cf. ibidem, Krüger an 
Bülow, 27th November 1906, ff. 000164–000166.
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real threat.67 President of the USA spoke from a wider perspective, not just 
of Japanese policies in China, when he noted that he was reassured by the 
clear evidence of the impossibility of the Japanisation of the country and the 
reduced intensity of anti-foreign diatribe. The president added that the Chinese 
government distinguished between the Great Powers as enemies of the East 
and of the West, with Japan clearly dominant in the first group.68
It wasn’t just the American president’s opinion, but almost more widely 
felt that at that time Beijing could not afford to behave in a dismissive or 
offensive manner to foreigners. The country was not in a situation in which it 
could afford such an attitude. As such, Great Britain, Germany and the other 
Great Powers did not need to change their policies regarding the Far East, and 
China specifically, at that time in any fundamental manner, and could focus 
on their priorities.
Conclusion
At the end of the Russo-Japanese War, China found itself in a situation where 
not only local elites, but even the imperial court itself, were aware that the 
country had to modernise, because if they didn’t China would be in danger of 
becoming a state of little significance. One of the key areas Beijing decided 
to engage with was the issue of railway and mining concessions. However, 
the Western powers had clear technological and organisational dominance in 
this field, and had no intention of giving up the rights they had acquired at 
the end of the 19th century. Furthermore, the Chinese lacked sufficient capital 
so that the dream of building the railways using only Chinese funding and 
Chinese workers seemed unrealistic. Germany, a great power which had also 
acquired influence in China at the end of the 19th century, was not immune to 
attempts by the local elite to gain control over railway construction. It should 
be noted, however, that as for other great powers (Great Britain in particular), 
these attempts were naïve ideas from Chinese politicians at either a central or 
67 Cf. ibidem, Merklinghaus an Goltz, 16th Oktober 1906, ff. 000131–000132.
68 PA AA, China No. 1, R 17689, 12th September 1906, f. 000040.
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local level. As such, German diplomatic representatives in China were able to 
repeatedly state in late 1905 and during 1906 that China did not have sufficient 
resources to implement railway construction themselves. They also carefully 
monitored the activities of London and Tokyo, who were potentially able to 
threaten Berlin’s interests. The Great Powers realised that Beijing could not 
threaten their railway concessions in any fundamental manner, and as such 
focused on their spheres of influence and bided their time.
Abstract
The contribution aims to present and analyze the German view of the 
complicated question of railway-building in China at the end of the Qing 
Empire era – concretely in the years 1905–1906. The authors plan to start at the 
end of the Russo-Japanese war, which was a key event in the transformation 
of the Great Powers policy in China, with the concentration on the German 
policy in the Middle Kingdom. They will than turn they attention to the 
German economic interests in this country with special regard to the building 
of the Chinese railways, which were conducted by foreign companies. They 
will define the construction of railways as a policy of following the political 
and economic interests of the Great Powers in China. The contribution will 
also focus on the question of the German methods to gain railway concession 
and how successful Germany was in its policy and whether it was able to take 
advantage of its opportunities.
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